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On Tuesday, August 16, 2017, Roy Moore, 1 seventy-year-old U.S. Senatehopeful and former (though perhaps ousted is more appropriate) Chief Justice of the
Alabama Supreme Court, trotted to the polls atop his horse, a brown and white
Tennessee walker named Sassy, to cast his vote in Alabama’s Senate Republican

*. Priya N. Purohit. J.D., Indiana University–Bloomington, Maurer School of Law,
2018. Thank you to my mentor, Professor Charles Geyh, for his intellectual generosity, for
dreaming up the seminar from which this Comment sprung forth, and for his friendship. Thank
you to the Indiana Law Journal editorial board for their skillful edits and thoughtful
suggestions—with special thanks to Editor-in-Chief extraordinaire, Hannah Miller. Finally,
thank you to my parents, Smita and Narayan, and my husband-to-be, Hans, for their
unwavering love and support. All views expressed, and errors, are my own.
1. This Comment was written before the sexual misconduct allegations surfaced against
Roy Moore, and before now-Senator Doug Jones defeated Moore in the December 2017
Alabama special election. However, even before the sexual misconduct allegations arose,
Moore was still grossly unfit to serve as a judge on the Alabama Supreme Court or in the U.S.
Senate. Because this Comment addresses the subject of religion and the judiciary, I do not
address the effect of those allegations on Moore as either a former judge or as a candidate for
U.S. Senate.
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primary.2 Clad in a black cowboy hat, black cowboy boots, blue jeans, and a fitted
black t-shirt bearing the phrase “MILITARY POLICE,” Moore dismounted his horse
and told the throng of reporters that he and his wife Kayla—also on horseback
—“look[ed] forward to registering [their] vote to make this country great again.”3
Moore continued, “I appreciate the people understanding that it’s not the money from
Washington that will buy us this election, it’s the people of Alabama that are going
to vote in this election.”4 Although Moore did not reach the majority support
threshold that Tuesday, he did beat sitting U.S. Senator Luther Strange a little over a
month later in the GOP Senate Runoff. 5
The crux of Moore’s ultimately failed Senate campaign was that “removing the
sovereignty of a Christian God from the functions of government is an act of
apostasy, an affront to the biblical savior as well as the Constitution.” 6 Moore’s stillaccessible campaign website details his lifelong dedication to “acknowledg[ing] the
sovereignty of God.”7 In fact, even his removals from office are couched in the
unmistakable language of religious conviction—Moore was punished for his twin
decisions to “acknowledge the sovereignty of God”8 and “uphold[] the sanctity of
marriage as between one man and one woman.” 9 But, as politicians often do, Moore
misses the point.
Moore was not removed twice from judicial office because he acknowledged the
sovereignty of the Judeo-Christian God; he was removed twice from office because
he refused to set aside his subjective interpretation that the Judeo-Christian God is
the moral foundation of the laws of the United States. 10 With Moore serving,
unfortunately, as the uniquely unlikeable mascot of those who would dare to bring
religion into the judicial decision-making process, it is both easy and popular to argue
that because judges are first and foremost public officers, they should be prohibited
from invoking religious values in their decision-making. As a state actor, anything

2. Emily Tillett, Candidate Arrives to Polls on Horseback to Cast Alabama Primary
Vote, CBS NEWS (Aug. 15, 2017, 1:44 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/candidate
-arrives-to-polls-on-horseback-to-cast-alabama-primary-vote/ [https://perma.cc/P733-M58S].
3. AL.com, Roy Moore Rides in to Vote, YOUTUBE (Aug. 15, 2017), https://www.you
tube.com/watch?v=GzBrcCOTQQQ&feature=youtu.be [https://perma.cc/DM8L-Q2PM].
4. Id.
5. Eric Bradner, Roy Moore Wins Alabama Senate GOP Primary Runoff, CNN POLITICS
(Sept. 27, 2017, 2:38 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/09/26/politics/alabama-senate-results
-roy-moore-luther-strange/index.html [https://perma.cc/P733-M58S].
6. Michael Scherer, Roy Moore Disrupts U.S. Senate Race in Alabama – and Prepares
for New Level of Defiance in Washington, WASH. POST (Sept. 21, 2017), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/politics/roy-moore-disrupts-alabama-senate-race--and-prepares-for
-new-level-of-defiance-in-washington/2017/09/21/2a88a4a2-9e38-11e7-9083-fbfddf6804c2
_story.html?utm_term=.1d74a993fb06 [https://perma.cc/PS93-FURS].
7. JUDGE ROY MOORE U.S. SENATE, https://www.roymoore.org/ [https://perma.cc/P9EF
-BBYR].
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. See Shaun Marker, “It’s Time for Roy’s Rock to Roll” . . . After the Court of the
Judiciary Speaks, Roy and His Rock, Roll, 31 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT
431, 442 (2005) (citation omitted).
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that the judge does bears the stamp of the government. And the government, per the
Constitution, must remain neutral when it comes to matters of religion. 11 Of course,
it is a problem when even a former judge such as Moore, several months after his
suspension from judicial office for defying federal court orders concerning same-sex
marriage,12 appears on a pastor’s radio show proclaiming that when God’s law
conflict with man’s law, “God’s laws are always superior.” 13 The problem grows
ever larger when Moore, speaking at a luncheon hosted by Pro-Life Mississippi,
declares that the First Amendment only protects the religious speech of Christians. 14
But Moore, despite his national prominence, is the exception when it comes to
judicial officers who invoke religious values in judicial decision-making—not the
norm. First, by all accounts, judges who are twice removed from office for failure to
adhere to the U.S. Constitution rarely mount (at least initially) successful campaigns
for legislative office. The idiosyncratic events that unfolded in Alabama in the fall
of 2017 are not at all indicative of a rising trend across the fifty states. 15 Second,
Moore’s adversarial conception of the relationship between law and Christianity is
not the only manner by which religion and law can interact. In fact, as this Comment
argues, there is a strong argument in favor of acknowledging the role of religion in
the judicial decision-making process, particularly where religion does not function
as the foundation for the decision, but as one within a constellation of values that
judges, who are already value-sensitive individuals,16 consider in order to arrive at a
just opinion.
While the saga of Moore’s refusal to put law above religion is perfect for the
incisive soundbites that thrive in a twenty-four-hour news cycle, placing Moore at
the epicenter of the conversation concerning religion and judicial decision-making
displaces a far more constructive conversation. A conversation exploring the
potential role or influence of religion on the judicial process itself. 17 After all, what

11. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
12. Campbell Robertson, Roy Moore, Alabama Chief Justice, Suspended Over Gay
Marriage Order, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/01/us/roy
-moore-alabama-chief-justice.html [https://perma.cc/Y82M-JYBF].
13. Antonia Blumberg, Alabama Senate Front-Runner: Evolution Is Fake and
Homosexuality
Should
Be
Illegal,
HUFF
POST
(Sept.
26,
2017),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/roy-moore-religion_us_59c2bd8be4b063b2531781a2
[https://perma.cc/A7CD-4KS3].
14. Mollie Reilly, Alabama Chief Justice Thinks the First Amendment Only Protects
Christians, HUFF POST (May 5, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/05/05/alabama
-judge-christians_n_5267662.html [https://perma.cc/M4RP-ZFDR].
15. It is important to distinguish between Roy Moore’s popularity as an antiestablishment candidate for U.S. Senate and Roy Moore’s removal from judicial office as the
result of the findings of Alabama’s Judicial Inquiry Commission. Roy Moore’s popularity is
likely due to a confluence of social and political factors that are beyond the scope of this
Comment, yet his popularity is not an indicator of the waning efficacy of judicial inquiry
commissions.
16. Wendell L. Griffen, The Case for Religious Values in Judicial Decision-Making, 81
MARQ. L. REV. 513, 515 (1998).
17. This Comment does not adopt a specific definition of religion, but approaches religion
in the same way that Scott C. Idleman does in The Concealment of Religious Values in Judicial
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judges truly believe, and thus what informs their adjudicatory decision-making, is
likely of deeper significance to rulings involving the most foundational aspects of
human nature, including the rights to abortion and same-sex marriage, as well as the
more mundane rulings involving jurisdictional, procedural, evidentiary, and remedial
questions.18
Before progressing any further, however, I would like to define what exactly this
Comment means by “the acknowledgment of religious values in judicial decisionmaking.” This definition borrows largely from a passage from Senior Judge Kermit
V. Lipez’s19 discussion of religion as a type of formative life experience: “Whatever
their life experiences might have been, judges cannot use them to disregard statutory
commands, clear precedents and the probative force of evidence.” 20 Yet many
judicial decisions do not fall neatly into binary categories but are interstitial—filling
in gaps where statutory or constitutional law is so general, or the common-law
doctrine is so outmoded, that the judge must provide the law with content and context
to decide specific cases.21
Deciding such cases will inevitably lean on a process that combines logic,
analysis, intuition, and common sense, all informed by the judge’s education, career,
and cultural identity, which may very well include a religious identity.22 However,
this Comment departs from Judge Lipez’s suggestion that transparency—judges
explicitly acknowledging the role of religion within the text of their decisions
—might be beneficial in certain contexts.23 Rather, this Comment posits that the
Code of Conduct for United States Judges (“Code of Conduct”)24 and the American
Bar Association’s (ABA) Model Code of Judicial Conduct (“Model Code”)25 should
explicitly acknowledge the role of extralegal values in judicial decision-making to
provide judges with guidance on the appropriate scope of the role of religion as a
legitimate external influence. Judge Lipez’s ideal of total transparency is attractive,
but the cost of such transparency would result in a steady stream of appeals—not to
mention the recusal and disqualification motions that would plague those judges who

Decisionmaking: “the designation of a system or belief as ‘religious’ may stem largely from
the nature of the questions it addresses and the role of the answers to those questions in the
life of one who adheres to the system or belief.” 91 VA. L. REV. 515, 517 n.9 (2005)
[hereinafter Concealment]. Idleman’s approach to religion is most useful because it does not
rely on membership to an institutionalized form of religion but embraces the presence of
nontraditional spiritual values in an individual’s life that provide a kind of “religious”
guidance.
18. See id. at 517.
19. Judge Lipez is a senior judge on the First Circuit Court of Appeals. Kermit V. Lipez,
U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR FIRST CIR., http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/kermit-v-lipez [https://perma
.cc/X49Q-WG9L].
20. Kermit V. Lipez, Is There a Place for Religion in Judicial Decision-Making?, 31 ME.
B.J. 16, 20 (2016).
21. Id. at 17.
22. See id. at 20.
23. Judge Lipez argues that transparency might be beneficial in the context of the
sentencing process, where a judge’s religious background might manifest itself in the form of
judicial mercy, which undoubtedly serves a legitimate purpose in that setting. Id. at 21.
24. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES (JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 2014).
25. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011).
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dare to author decisions averring religious influence. Consequently, this Comment
advocates for limited amendments to the abovementioned codes to initiate
transformation in public perception of the role that extralegal values such as religion
arguably already play in judicial decision-making.
This Comment advocates for the acknowledgment of religious values in judicial
decision-making in three parts. Part I explores the role of religion in American
politics, and more specifically, the role of religion in federal judicial confirmation
hearings and state-level judicial elections. Membership to an institutionalized
religion often performs an essential gatekeeping function when it comes to assessing
the background or personal values of a candidate for political or judicial office. The
initially positive role of religion in judicial selection processes suggests that the
practice of refusing to acknowledge the role that religion likely already plays in
judicial decision-making is wholly cosmetic. This skin-deep predilection only leads
to the concealment of religious values in judicial decision-making, and such
concealment benefits neither judge nor litigant.
Part II considers arguments for and against acknowledging the role of religion in
judicial decision-making. Specifically, Part II looks to arguments proffered by Judge
Lipez, Judge Wendell L. Griffen, Scott C. Idleman, and the late Judge Marion
Callister in Idaho v. Freeman in favor of acknowledgment, and former New Mexico
Supreme Court Justice Gene E. Franchini, Bruce A. Green, and Derek H. Davis in
favor of maintaining the faux secular status quo. Part III recommends changes to
Rule 2.4 of the Model Code, as well as Canons 3(A)(1) and 3(C)(1) of the Code of
Conduct. I propose adding language to the Comment to Rule 2.4, which governs
external influences on judicial conduct, 26 to distinguish between appropriate
consultation with extralegal sources and inappropriate supplanting of the law with
extralegal sources. I propose entirely new commentary for Canon 3(A)(1), which
governs a federal judge’s performance of her adjudicative responsibilities, 27 and
Canon 3(C)(1), which governs disqualification,28 respectively, to reiterate two ideas
highlighted in this Comment. First, faithfulness to the law does not preclude
consultation with extralegal sources; and second, determinations of judicial
impartiality are based on the “disinterested observer” standard29—not the
perceptions of the parties appearing before a judge.
I. INSTITUTIONALIZED RELIGION AS THE GATEKEEPER TO THE JUDICIARY
At a recent hearing for Amy Coney Barrett of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit, formerly a law professor at Notre Dame, Democratic Senator Diane
Feinstein expressed grave doubts that now-Judge Barrett would uphold Roe v.
Wade30 due to her traditional Catholic beliefs.31 During that same hearing, another

26. Id. at r. 2.4.
27. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR U.S. JUDGES Canon 3(A)(1) (JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 2014).
28. Id. at Canon 3(C)(1).
29. Idaho v. Freeman, 507 F. Supp. 706, 727 (D. Idaho 1981).
30. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
31. Emma Green, Should a Judge’s Nomination Be Derailed by Her Faith?, ATLANTIC
(Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/09/catholics-senate-amy
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Democrat, Senator Sheldon Whitehouse, was visibly irritated that now-Judge Barrett
and her fellow nominee, then-sitting Michigan Supreme Court Justice Joan Larsen
(now-Judge Larsen of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit), were
respectively unwilling to discuss the intersection between their personal beliefs and
their legal decision-making processes. Senator Whitehouse lamented, “[t]o sit here
and pretend that there is no role for people’s personal and private views . . . when
they go to the court—it’s just, it’s so preposterous as to be silly.”32
Senator Whitehouse is correct—such pretensions are preposterous and silly. The
very fact that Senate hearings on federal judicial nominees even address religion
suggests dual realities: that senators recognize there is a high probability that
personal values do permeate judicial decision-making, and that membership to
normative, institutionalized Judeo-Christian religions frequently serves a
gatekeeping function, demonstrating that the would-be judge passes the baseline
“trustworthiness” test. If then-Professor Barrett or then-Justice Larsen were, say,
card-carrying members of the Order of Bards, Ovates, and Druids, Senators Feinstein
and Whitehouse would be expressing their misgivings about other nominees.
Elected judges, too, are implicitly—though perhaps depending on the region,
explicitly—required to subscribe to a normative, institutionalized Judeo-Christian
religion. According to Wendell Griffen, an Arkansas appellate judge and Baptist
minister, “[i]n many instances the candidates for judicial office include their religious
affiliation in their campaign materials.”33 The inclusion of such personal information
in campaign materials reveals that not only is the electorate interested in learning
such information about their elected officials, but candidates for judicial office
perceive a value in revealing such otherwise private information. That religion plays
a meaningful role in the lives of millions of people all over the world is hardly a
revolutionary statement. One of the reasons that an electorate might be eager to learn
about the religious affiliations of candidates for judicial office—and one of the
reasons that candidates are generally quite willing to share such information—is so
the electorate can use that knowledge to forge an immediate connection with the
candidate. I don’t know you and you don’t know me, but we both worship the same
(or at least a) God, and that means I can relate to you on a human level.
To illustrate this point, I offer two lines of reasoning. First, atheists are often
treated as aberrant. For example, in 2007, only forty-five percent of Americans said
they would vote for a qualified atheist presidential candidate. 34 A study from the
University of British Columbia found that the reason atheists are so disliked boils
down to trust.35 The study revealed that people distrust atheists due to the belief that
people behave better when they think that God is watching over them, and such self-

-barrett/539124/ [https://perma.cc/3JAN-K92P].
32. Id.
33. Griffen, supra note 16, at 516.
34. Jeffrey M. Jones, Some Americans Reluctant to Vote for Mormon, 72-Year-Old
Presidential Candidates, GALLUP (Feb. 20, 2007), http://news.gallup.com/poll/26611/some
-americans-reluctant-vote-mormon-72yearold-presidential-candidates.aspx [https://perma.cc
/QX28-GVN9].
35. Daisy Grewal, In Atheists We Distrust, SCI. AM. (Jan. 17, 2012), https://www
.scientificamerican.com/article/in-atheists-we-distrust/ [https://perma.cc/C8DL-CQVN].
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consciousness spurs them to comport themselves in more socially acceptable ways.36
Second, when people are at their most vulnerable, religion can serve as a powerful
source of guidance and comfort. In the week following the terror attacks on
September 11, 2001, research published in The New England Journal of Medicine
found that sixty percent of Americans attended a religious or memorial service and
Bible sales rose twenty-seven percent.37 It makes sense, then, that candidates for
judicial office, whether by appointment or election, must claim some religious
affiliation if they hope to be successful.
The remainder of Part I turns back to a point made in the first paragraph of this
Part, that senators themselves, evidenced by their aggressive questioning of a
candidates’ religious beliefs, acknowledge that personal values can and do play a role
in the judicial decision-making process. On the elective side, the prevalence of
religion in judicial campaigns solidifies the same point. Let’s begin with the latter.
In recent years, emboldened by the rush of big money into judicial elections, 38
judicial campaigns have become “nastier, noisier, and costlier.”39 Campaigns have
become costlier, in part, because there are so many effective mediums through which
to reach the electorate. One such medium is television. Anthony Champagne
highlights the key themes that judicial candidates seek to impart to prospective
voters.40 Champagne isolates three unsurprising themes: crime control, civil justice,
and family values.41 Within the theme of family values, Champagne finds that
demonstrable religious convictions operate as valuable proxies: one Mississippi
candidate highlighted his role as a Baptist deacon when describing his involvement
with a child protection program. 42 An Alabama candidate connected his position as
a deacon to his thirty-year marriage.43
On the appointive side, before revisiting the discussion of the Senate hearings
concerning Judge Barrett and Judge Larsen, let’s take a quick detour into the Senate
confirmation hearings of yore. The date is September 14, 2005, and it is the third day
of then-Judge John Roberts’s (of the Court of Appeals for District of Columbia
Circuit) Senate confirmation hearings concerning his nomination to the Supreme
Court.44 Senator Feinstein, musing about the “role Catholicism would play” in his
decisions if appointed to the Supreme Court, asks then-Judge Roberts to reaffirm

36. Id.
37. Harold G. Koenig, Research on Religion, Spirituality, and Mental Health: A Review,
54 CANADIAN J. PSYCHIATRY 283, 285 (2009).
38. Anthony Champagne, Television Ads in Judicial Campaigns, 35 IND. L. REV. 669,
670 (2002).
39. Id. (citing Roy A. Schotland, Comment, Judicial Independence and Accountability,
61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 149, 150 (1998)).
40. See id. at 675–81.
41. Id. at 674–79.
42. Id. at 680.
43. Id.
44. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice
of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005),
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/GPO-CHRG-ROBERTS.pdf [https://perma
.cc/C8DL-CQVN].
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President John F. Kennedy’s statement that the “separation of church and state is
absolute.”45 Then-Judge Roberts declines to do so.46 “I don’t know what you mean
by absolute separation of church and state,” he opines, “I do know this, that my faith
and my religious beliefs do not play a role in judging.” 47 Senator Feinstein has no
follow-up questions on the topic.48
Perhaps Senator Feinstein was satisfied with now-Chief Justice Roberts’s answer
to her question; or, perhaps she just sensed that she was never going to get the answer
that she wanted, a simple “yes, Senator.” But what is striking about this exchange,
and what perhaps never quite gets teased out in the highly polarizing debates
surrounding religion and the judiciary, is that when Senator Feinstein contemplates
the role of Catholicism in then-Judge Roberts’s decision-making process, she is not
actually asking whether the separation between church and state is absolute.
Catholicism, of course, can play a role in one’s decision-making processes even
while said decision-maker is “absolutely” capable of separating church and state.
And yet she conflates the two questions during her exchange with then-Judge
Roberts.
Fast forward twelve years later to September 2017: Senator Whitehouse captures
Senator Feinstein’s enduring logical fallacy in his frustration with then-Professor
Barrett and then-Justice Larsen.49 According to Senator Whitehouse, to operate under
the pretense that personal values play no role on the bench is laughable.50 Yet if either
nominee had been so bold as to honestly discuss the interplay between religion and
judicial decision-making, they would have shattered the legal blogosphere. While
senators, legislators, and citizens are aching for real insight into the kinds of
considerations, life experiences, and values that go into the judicial decision-making
process, the actual confirmation process offers no such insight. The increasingly
hostile environment surrounding judicial—particularly Supreme Court and federal
appellate court—appointments indicates that legislators and non-legislators alike
realize that a potential judge or justice’s religious background can often be just as
important as their scholarly or professional training.51 But this begs the question: why
are Americans so hell-bent on acting against their own intuition?
The federal appointive process is uniquely unsatisfying in that it can elevate a
nominee’s religious background to a major point of contention, but then fails to ever
provide a mechanism by which that religious background can serve as anything other
than a liability. And maybe that nominee’s religious background will be a liability;
maybe her background will prevent her from fair and impartial application of the
law. But if that is the case, then the appointment process is the place to exclude such
bad actors. If religion comes up on a regular basis in these hearings—and in judicial
election campaigns for that matter—then surely it is because religion maintains
enduring value in American sociocultural reality.

45. Id. at 227.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Green, supra note 31.
50. Id.
51. Mark C. Modak-Truran, Reenchanting the Law: The Religious Dimension of Judicial
Decision Making, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 709, 713 (2004).
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II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE DEBATE SURROUNDING THE ROLE OF RELIGION IN
JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING
A. Against the Role of Religion in Judicial Decision-Making
Before delving into the arguments in favor of and against acknowledging the role
of religion in judicial decision-making, it is important to take stock of the rules that
those who write against the role of religion in judicial decision-making often cite in
their favor. Outside of codes of conduct aimed squarely at regulating judicial actors,
critics often cite the Establishment Clause,52 the Free Exercise Clause,53 and the Due
Process Clause.54 This Comment does not address these perceived limitations on the
presence of religious values in judicial decision-making because they are enshrined
in the Constitution, and the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments are unlikely to
budge in their respective language. Furthermore, cases concerning judicial
disqualification motions rarely reference constitutional limitations on religion in
judicial decision-making, but generally articulate alleged violations in the language
of the ABA’s Model Code of Judicial Conduct (“Model Code”), the Code of Conduct
for United States Judges, or 28 U.S.C. § 455, the federal statute regulating the
disqualification of federal judges. 55 Consequently, this Part focuses on the use of
rules within these two codes to set up a discussion of the arguments against the role
of religion in judicial decision-making.56
Rule 2.4 of the Model Code governs external influences on judicial conduct. 57
Section (B) states that a “judge shall not permit family, social, political, financial, or
other interests or relationships to influence the judge’s judicial conduct or
judgment.”58 Religion does not receive a special shout out in Rule 2.4, but likely falls
under “social” or “other” interests. Canon 2(A) of the Code of Conduct asserts that a

52. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion . . . .”).
53. Id. (The First Amendment continues, “Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”).
54. Id. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law.”); id. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”). Scholars have questioned “whether
decisionmaking grounded in religious values or authority can be said to exhibit a rational basis
or a legitimate government purpose,” and whether the role of religion in judicial decisionmaking raises notice issues, as the parties may not have knowledge of the values on which the
judge is basing her decision. Scott C. Idleman, The Limits of Religious Values in Judicial
Decisionmaking, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 537, 556, 558–59 (1998) [hereinafter Limits].
55. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2012).
56. Part III ultimately proposes revisions to both codes to permit acknowledgment of the
role of religion in judicial decision-making. Part II discusses § 455 at length.
57. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011). Canon 2(B) of the
Code of Conduct for United States Judges imparts a similar point: “A judge should not allow
family, social, political, financial, or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or
judgment.” CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 2(B) (JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE 2014).
58. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.4(B) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011).
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“judge should respect and comply with the law and should act at all times in a manner
that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.” 59
Canon 2 addresses impropriety and the appearance of impropriety, and the
supplanting of legal precedent with religious text or values à la Roy Moore is a
perfect example of Canon 2 impropriety sprung to life.
Finally, the regulations within Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct require “fair[],
impartial[] and diligent[]” performance of judicial duties. 60 Canon 3 addresses,
among other concerns, a judge’s adjudicative responsibilities, in addition to grounds
for judicial disqualification.61 Religion, while not expressly invoked in the judge’s
adjudicative responsibilities, is implied in the “partisan interests” portion of Canon
3(A)(1): “A judge should be faithful to, and maintain professional competence in,
the law and should not be swayed by partisan interests, public clamor, or fear of
criticism.”62 Religion is similarly implicitly referenced in Canon 3(C)(1), which
requires that the judge disqualify herself in a proceeding in which her impartiality
might be questioned.63 Because Canon 3(C) can trigger disqualification not only
where the judge is acting in an identifiably partial manner, but where the judge’s
impartiality is in question at all, the combination of Canon 3(C) and an outwardly
religious judge can result in calls for recusal or disqualification.
Both codes clearly have an interest in preserving an impartial judiciary that, to the
public eye, operates perfectly free of external influences—whether those influences
be social, personal, political, or financial. When it comes to the external influence
prong of Rule 2.4, critics are generally accepting of the fact that external influences
do exist, and will subconsciously, from time-to-time, if not all the time, enter the
judge’s mind.64 And yet, according to scholars such as Bruce A. Green, “it does not
follow that the judge may consciously draw on these beliefs in making judicial
determinations.”65 To the extent they enter the judge’s mind, posits Green, “he would
be expected to put them to the side and make the decision based exclusively on
considerations that the law prescribes.” 66 Green’s distinction between the
subconscious and the conscious when it comes to judicial decision-making is
problematic: if a judge is by definition unaware of the influences or experiences at
work in her subconscious, then how is she to consciously set those influences or
experiences aside? Green’s theory supposes that every judge has a convenient on and
off switch that controls her conscious, so that when necessary, she can slip into her
personalized philosophical vacuum.

59. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 2(A) (JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
2014).
60. Id. at Canon 3.
61. Id.
62. Id. at Canon 3(A)(1).
63. Id. at Canon 3(C)(1).
64. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, The Role of Personal Values in Professional
Decisionmaking, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 19, 34–35 (1997) (“[A] judge’s personal moral and
religious beliefs are part of what the judge invariably brings to the decisionmaking process . .
. and the judge may be influenced by them subconsciously.”).
65. Id. at 34.
66. Id. at 34–35.
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Former New Mexico Supreme Court Justice Gene E. Franchini echoes Green
when he narrates a tale from his time as a New Mexico trial judge.67 Rather than
adhere to the state’s stringent mandatory sentencing law for certain crimes
committed while using a gun when he believed doing so would result in grave
injustice to the first-time offender standing before him, then-Judge Franchini
resigned.68 He resigned, in his own words, because he did not want “to impose on
any other person—judicial officer or not—[his] personal beliefs of what justice is, or
[his] ideas as to its administration.”69 Franchini certainly made the correct decision—
if one cannot follow the law as clearly stated then resignation, recusal, or
disqualification are all solid options.
However, what Franchini gets wrong is his equation of his personal moral
dilemma with the average judge trying to apply the law free of any “personal,
religious, or philosophical beliefs.”70 Franchini, perhaps going even one step further
than Green, claims that if a judge cannot “set aside any and all of these factors in the
decisionmaking process[,] . . . resignation may be the only remaining option.”71
Franchini did not have a problem with “setting aside” his personal values; he had a
problem because he literally wanted to set aside the law to come to a conclusion
unsupported by clear-cut sentencing guidelines. Most judges who engage in a valuesensitive decision-making process do not elevate external influences—their personal
beliefs, values, and experiences—above the law; rather, they use their individual
backgrounds as one of many lenses through which the law can be understood.
Not unlike Rule 2.4, which warns against external influences, Canon 3(A)(1)
states that a judge should maintain professional competence in the law and not be
swayed by partisan interests.72 Professional competence in the law is required, among
other reasons, to promote stability and predictability for those appearing before a
judge.73 If judges are free to use their religious beliefs in their legal decision-making,
how will litigants and lawyers be able to predict or prepare for the outcome of their
cases?74 Furthermore, the judiciary only represents a limited slice of the multitude of
religions practiced in the United States. Allowing judges to use or consult religious
teachings in their decision-making would invariably result in the advancement and

67. See Gene E. Franchini, Conscience, Judging, and Conscientious Judging, 2 J. APP.
PRAC. & PROCESS 19 (2000).
68. Id. at 19–21.
69. Id. at 21.
70. Id. at 25.
71. Id.
72. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 3(A)(1) (JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE 2014).
73. Margot G. Benedict, Note, Curbing Religion’s Influence on the Judiciary, 29 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 793, 798 (2016) (“Allowing religion into decisionmaking would create an
unpredictable atmosphere surrounding the courts and would undermine what people think of
as the law.”).
74. See, e.g., id.; see also Kent Greenawalt, Religious Expression in the Public Square
—The Building Blocks for an Intermediate Position, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1411, 1419 (1996)
(“[O]ne expects judges to rely on arguments they believe should have force for all judges.”).
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enforcement of a select few religions’ ideals in the American legal system. 75
According to Derek H. Davis, alongside this interest in democratic stability, our
political system separates church and state because any government endorsement of
religion “sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders . . . and an
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the
political community.”76 Such a message, that “adherents . . . are favored members of
the political community,” would then undoubtedly implicate Canon 3(C)(1),
requiring recusal or disqualification every time there might be perceived religious
asymmetry between party and judge.
But again, such critiques of the dangers of religion in judicial decision-making
fail to distinguish between using religious values as one of many values that the judge
can account for in arriving at a decision, and using religion as the sole value in
arriving at a decision. The latter is tantamount to government-endorsed religion. The
former is not. Professional competence in the law does not require a judge to act as
though the law exists in a vacuum. Law does not exist in a vacuum, just as those who
are tasked with applying it do not. In the United States, citizens and noncitizens of
all faiths have access to a predominantly Judeo-Christian federal and state judiciary.
Religious asymmetry between party and judge is not grounds for disqualification;
religious asymmetry is a reality of the American judicial process. Additionally,
concerns of stability and predictability are overblown. Well-trained lawyers do all
kinds of background research involving judges before whom the lawyers plan to
appear. Such research is not an affront to the norms of democracy—it is simply good
lawyering.
B. In Favor of the Role of Religion in Judicial Decision-Making
Section B argues three overarching points. The first and second points are
interrelated: first, religion parallels secular values that are already acknowledged in
judicial decision-making, such as history or economic theory; second, there is an
important, but oft overlooked intersection between religious teaching and intellectual
traditions. That religion can offer such intellectual merit reinforces the notion that
religious values can be as edifying and serviceable as their secular counterparts.
Third, this Section contends that despite the limitations on judges’ out-of-court
religious activities, these limitations are not nearly as pervasive as one might think.
State judges are rarely disciplined for their participation in religious activities, and
even federal judges are rarely subject to disqualification under § 455 for their
religious affiliations.

75. Greenawalt, supra note 74, at 1418–19.
76. Derek H. Davis, Religion and the Abuse of Judicial Power, 39 J. CHURCH & ST. 203,
208 (1997) (citation omitted).
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1. Parallels Between Religious Values and Secular Values
Judge Lipez believes that “religion . . . plays an unacknowledged part in judicial
decision-making,”77 and “rather than pretending otherwise, [society] should
acknowledge that fact and explore its implications.” 78 The majority of judges
(perhaps, at the risk of generalizing, like most Americans) are raised within some
religion tradition, and thus it is not feasible to expect that they will shun without
qualification that particular aspect of their identity each time they take the black.79
Those who oppose engagement with religious values in the judicial decision-making
process often cite the fact that the judiciary, in large part, fails to mirror the religious
diversity of the citizenry.80 However, all judges do not share a communal knowledge
or understanding of history, economics, mathematics, science, literature, the arts, or
even cultural and social norms.81 Society does not demand absolute homogeneity of
thought or action from its judges—and rightfully so. Just as judges are not expected
to disavow their economic, political, philosophical, psychological, historical, or
scientific backgrounds at the door when deciding a case, judges should not be
expected to disavow their religious backgrounds. 82
Judge Griffen echoes the perspective of Judge Lipez.
[If] economic values, social values, values about political ideology and
the function of government in human society, and values about risks and
benefits can be analyzed and included in the jurisprudential way judges
decide cases and controversies, religious values can also be analyzed and
included jurisprudentially.83
Religious values can very much be the object(s) of jurisprudential analysis. That
religious voices are different from those voices grounded in secular traditions does
not make them less articulable, less reliable, or even less susceptible to vigorous
debate and open criticism.84 In fact, as Judge Griffen argues, perhaps the most
effective means by which to regulate the use of religious values in judicial decisionmaking is to condone their entry into the judicial marketplace of ideas—to allow
religious values to be “examined, challenged, debated, and defended as more or less
helpful means of reaching just decisions.” 85

77. Lipez, supra note 20, at 17.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See, e.g., Benedict, supra note 73, at 798–99.
81. Griffen, supra note 16, at 518.
82. Id.; see also Idleman, Concealment, supra note 17, at 521 (“In particular, whether
from the standpoint of psychology, theology, or philosophy, it is generally accepted that the
religious or religiously-influenced aspects of one’s perspectives or thought processes cannot
simply be set aside or excluded, like some form of non-admitted evidence, at least for purposes
of addressing or resolving matters of any significance.”).
83. Griffen, supra note 16, at 516.
84. Id. at 519.
85. Id.
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2. The Intellectual Value of Religious Teachings and Traditions
Alongside the notion that religion functions as one of many values that the valuesensitive judge might consider in her decision-making process, it bears mentioning
that religious teachings and values are not unlike their secular counterparts (i.e.,
philosophy, history, arts, literature) in that religion is not merely a source of “private
comfort or irrational insight.”86 Scott C. Idleman highlights the intrinsic intellectual
value of religious traditions: “Many of the religious traditions in this country are,
after all, repositories for centuries of deep reflection upon human nature, society, and
ethics—in short, upon the human condition.” 87 In that vein, even the nonreligious
judge may not be able to avoid reliance on religious values, because questions
involving religion and morality are so deeply intertwined.88 And even where one can
identify “deep moral premises” without consultation with religious sources, the
religious sources are “undoubtedly of causal significance.” 89 Religious values, while
not universal across all faiths, certainly have significant overlap when it comes to
basic themes surrounding human nature and justice.
At the margins of judicial philosophy, consultation with religious sources can be
humbling and edifying for the well-meaning judge. Religion is akin to a subset of
ideology; but religion, unlike secular ideology, is emboldened by the moral force of
faith in the divine. Because of the moral force that often attaches itself to religious
ideology, religion is approached not as a positive, rational force, but as a perilous,
irrational path down which the likes of Roy Moore would have the judiciary go. Yet
it is unfair to disqualify religion as an intellectually feeble enterprise because isolated
bad actors like Roy Moore think that the rule of law is inferior to their subjective
interpretation of Christianity, or because well-meaning judges such as Gene
Franchini conflate an unwillingness to consider other values beyond their individual
notions of justice with an unwillingness to recognize the law as is.90
Idleman’s basic premise, that religious traditions in the United States are
repositories for centuries of profound reflection on the human condition, counters the
Moores and Franchinis of the judiciary. There is intellectual weight behind the moral
force associated with religious ideology—but the judge making use of religious
ideology must be willing and capable to engage with its intellectual aspects. It is
worth mentioning that religious and secular values do not come into play in every
decision. Such values are most useful, as the previous paragraph begins, at the
margins of judicial philosophy. In those cases that do not fall into binary categories
and require the judge to provide the law with content and context, religion should be
treated as another source of ideology or secular value that a judge looks to for
nonbinding guidance.91

86. Teresa S. Collett, “The Kings Good Servant, But God’s First”: The Role of Religion
in Judicial Decisionmaking, 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 1277, 1296 (2000).
87. Idleman, Limits, supra note 54, at 550.
88. Id.
89. Kent Greenawalt, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS 147 (1995).
90. See supra text accompanying notes 67–71 (discussing Franchini’s decision to resign).
91. Thanks to Professor Charles G. Geyh for helping to flesh out this point.
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3. The Myth of the Secular Judge
The final reason that the role of religion should be acknowledged in judicial
decision-making is that judges frequently engage in religious activities outside their
chambers. Even in hot button disqualification cases where the religious affiliations
of judges are under the microscope, the outcome tends to favor the judge. This
Section discusses a federal disqualification case, Idaho v. Freeman,92 to illustrate the
difficulty that litigants face when attempting to force recusal or disqualification for
reasons related to religious affiliation. First, however, this Section briefly highlights
a similar phenomenon in the state-court system, where judges may serve in positions
within their churches and religious communities.
Numerous state judicial ethics advisory committee opinions appreciate—as
opposed to punish—the role that judges can perform as “community leaders through
religious organizations, and understand the desire of judges to serve their religious
communities as volunteers.”93 The Arizona Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee
permitted a judge to “play a prominent role in a religious ceremony or service.”94
The Maryland Judicial Ethics Committee permitted a judge to serve as a vestryman
(or church council member) for his church. 95 The Oklahoma Judicial Ethics Advisory

92. 507 F. Supp. 706 (D. Idaho 1981). In addition to Freeman, there are numerous
significant cases from the lower federal courts that address the issue of religion and
disqualification. See, e.g., Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colo., 289 F.3d 648,
659–60 (10th Cir. 2002) (finding no abuse of discretion in district judge’s refusal to recuse
himself from the case because of his membership in the Episcopal church, reiterating that
“facts pleaded will not suffice to show the personal bias required by the statute if they go to
the background and associations of the judge rather than to his appraisal of a party personally”
(quoting Pennsylvania v. Local Union 542, Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, 388 F. Supp. 155,
159 (E.D. Pa. 1974)); Singer v. Wadman, 745 F.2d 606, 608 (10th Cir. 1984) (denying
defendant’s motion to recuse Mormon judge on grounds that lawsuit involved, inter alia, the
“theocratic power structure of Utah”); United States v. Odeh, No. 13-cr-20772, 2014 WL
3767808, at *1 (E.D. Mich. July 31, 2014) (denying defendant’s motion to recuse district judge
based on judge’s fundraising efforts on behalf of the Detroit Jewish Federation, a social service
organization which distributes some of its funds to provide social services in Israel and other
international Jewish communities); United States v. El-Gabrowny, 844 F. Supp. 955
(S.D.N.Y. 1994) (a district judge declined to recuse himself from deciding a charge of
conspiracy in connection with the World Trade Center bombings in the face of claims that his
Jewish faith and alleged ties to Zionism rendered him incapable of serving as an impartial
judge); Menora v. Ill. High Sch. Ass’n, 527 F. Supp. 632, 634–35 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (a district
judge refused to recuse himself in a case seeking to prevent Jewish youth from wearing
yarmulkes while participating in interscholastic sports, despite his prior involvement with the
American Jewish Congress).
93. Daniel R. Suhr, The Religious Liberty of Judges, 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 179,
189 (2011).
94. Id. at 189 n.63 (citing Ariz. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 93-01 (1993),
https://www.azcourts.gov/portals/137/ethics_opinions/1993/93-01.pdf
[https://perma.cc
/D2FK-H73L]).
95. Id. (citing Md. Judicial Ethics Comm., Op. 1980-10 (1980), https://www.courts.state
.md.us/sites/default/files/import/ethics/pdfs/1980-10.pdf [https://perma.cc/L4CD-WCD8]).
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Panel permitted a judge to serve as the president of the board of directors of a private
Christian high school.96 To be fair, state ethics boards and panels place defined limits
on the religious liberty of judges, particularly where religious affiliations and politics
intersect, as well as where judges might use the prestige of their judicial office to
garner funds for religious causes.97 Yet such limitations seem reasonable, and do not
preclude or discourage judges from meaningful involvement within a religious
community. The elective side, while still unwilling to locate an affirmative space for
religion in the judicial decision-making process, is arguably more willing than the
appointive system to acknowledge that religion does have some value beyond
functioning as a potential source of bias, as evidenced by the sheer number of
advisory opinions that permit religious activity by judges. However, as the following
discussion of Freeman demonstrates, even the appointive side allows judges to serve
within religious communities, and the standard used for disqualification under §
455(a) evinces a reluctance to mandate disqualification based solely on evidence of
that service.
In Freeman, Arizona and Idaho state legislators brought action asserting the right
of the state(s) to rescind ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) and
challenging the extension of the ratification period.98 Defendants, the National
Organization of Women (NOW), moved to disqualify U.S. District Judge Marion
Callister under § 455, contending that his impartiality might reasonably be
questioned because he formerly held the position of Regional Representative in the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (“Church”), which publicly opposed the
ERA.99 The court held, inter alia, that a judge’s background associations, including

96. Id. at 190 n.63 (citing Okla. Judicial Ethics Advisory Panel, Op. 2007-4 (2007),
http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=449053) [https://perma
.cc/2TJS-A6B3].
97. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 1.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011) (“A judge shall not
abuse the prestige of judicial office to advance the personal or economic interests of the judge
or others . . . .”). See, e.g., Ark. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 94-03 (1994),
www.arkansas.gov/jeac/opinions/94_03.html (finding that while mere attendance at a
church’s annual scholarship fundraising dinner is permissible for a judge, being the guest of
honor or a speaker is not); N.Y. Judicial Ethics Comm., Op. 03-75 (2003),
www.nycourts.gov/ip/judicialethics/opinions/03-75.htm
[https://perma.cc/6ABS-CCEV]
(finding that a full-time judge should decline to serve on advisory panel of a religious order
that reviews and considers procedures for handling allegations of sexual misconduct by
members of the order).
98. Idaho v. Freeman, 507 F. Supp. 706 (D. Idaho 1981).
99. Id. at 729. NOW’s motion to disqualify additionally asserted that the court’s
“appearance of impartiality might reasonably be questioned because”:
(1) the Church or its members had been politically active in various parts of the
United States in opposing the ERA’s ratification; (2) “[i]n certain states, . . . antiERA lobbying efforts were organized and supported by Church Regional
Representatives who were purportedly asked by the Church to undertake these
tasks”; (3) “Judge Marion J. Callister [wa]s a member of the Church and at the
time of the filing of this case was serving as a Regional Representative”; (4) “[a]s
a Regional Representative, it was Judge Callister’s duty to assist the general
leadership of the Church in the operation of Church programs in the region to
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his religious affiliations, should not be grounds for disqualification, and that a trial
judge’s former position as a Regional Representative in the Church did not require
disqualification, despite the fact that Church leaders may have stated their opposition
to the ERA, and opposed the extension of the ratification deadline.100
As the basis for its holding, the court noted that the Church was neither “directly
nor indirectly involved in the pending litigation as a party or as an amicus curiae, nor
had [it] ever attempted to promote its position on the ERA [through] litigation.”101
NOW argued that under the ABA’s Model Code, a judge should refrain from serving
as an officer in any organization whose interest might come before the court—for
example, the Anti-Defamation League of B’nia Brith, the Sierra Club, and the
NAACP.102 The court, however, countered that the Church, unlike the cited advocacy
groups, were not single-issue organizations that primarily make use of the judicial
system to advance their advocacy goals.103 Judge Callister’s point that churches,
while certainly operating as important loci for ideological exploration, are not at their
core advocacy-centric enterprises, is buried in a footnote in his opinion.104 And while
Freeman has been the subject of intense discussion for nearly four decades, this point
rarely makes the metaphorical airwaves. Judge Callister’s holding captures an
important distinction between churches advocating for a particular outcome and
advocacy groups themselves: churches do not use the courts as the primary vehicle
of furthering their social or political agendas—churches use community
organization, public outreach, and faith-based education. Conversely, advocacy
groups, such as the NAACP, since their inception, have pursued their stated policy
objectives (i.e., attacking segregation and racial inequality) through the courts.
Next, the court observed that because NOW conceded that a motion to disqualify
based solely upon membership in the Church would be improper,105 the focal point
of the court’s inquiry should be “whether there is anything particular about the
holding of the position of a Regional Representative in the Church that would require
disqualification” under § 455(a).106 A judge should disqualify herself under § 455(a)
“[o]nly when a disinterested observer, knowing all the facts, would determine that a
judge’s appearance of impartiality could reasonably be questioned.”107 A Regional
Representative, the court noted, is one of “limited jurisdiction and circumscribed
responsibility,” and organizing political lobbying efforts is not part of the

which he was assigned” (including his duties carrying forth the Church’s
opposition to the ERA); (5) “[t]he Church considers its position on the ERA to
be of the utmost importance and those who back the ERA are subject to sanctions,
including excommunication, as is evidenced by proceedings taken against
the leader of the group ‘Mormons for ERA.’”
Id. at 729–30.
100. Id. at 729, 733.
101. Id. at 731.
102. Id. at 731 n.33.
103. Id.
104. See id.
105. Id. at 731.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 733.
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responsibilities of the Regional Representative. 108 If such an act were undertaken, it
would be in the representative’s personal, rather than Church, capacity. 109
If NOW had succeeded in its disqualification motion, judges would have
effectively lost the right to participate in religious communities. Judge Callister’s
erstwhile role as Regional Representative certainly suggested that he might have
personal beliefs that did not align with those of NOW, but that role did not preclude
him from providing the parties with an impartial forum in which to try their case.
After all, the standard for determining whether a judge’s impartiality cannot be
questioned is not applied from the point of view of the parties, but from the
perspective of a disinterested observer.110 That judge and litigant do not share similar
religious values is not a sign of judicial bias or lack of impartiality; if such ideological
divergence were a sign of bias or partiality, then the robust protections associated
with the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment111 would not apply to judges.
“The free exercise of religion means, first and foremost, the right to believe and
profess whatever religious doctrine one desires.” 112
Yet the U.S. Supreme Court has long acknowledged a vital distinction between
the “freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of
things, the second cannot be.”113 Judges are protected by the “freedom to believe”
and litigants are protected by the limitations placed on the judges’ “freedom to act.”
Implicit in Cantwell’s statement that judges may not act based on their beliefs is the
expectation that religious judges have the capacity to separate the outcome suggested
by their religious convictions and the outcomes directed by the evidence and relevant
law. This Comment argues that an impartial, value-sensitive judge can consult
religious values—where religious values would be useful—alongside other secular
values to arrive at the outcome directed by the evidence and relevant law. The way
the judge interprets and applies relevant law to the evidence is certainly influenced
by the judge’s upbringing, education, career history, and other formative
experiences, including, perhaps, a judge’s religious faith.
In his opinion, Judge Callister devoted no space to explaining the role of the
Church in his daily life. Yet it is clear, evidenced by his former position as a Regional
Representative, that the Church did influence his sense of self. The late Judge
Callister’s Mormon faith likely impacted his individual choices, personal and
professional commitments, and ideological alignments. Fortunately, the laws
surrounding disqualification procedure recognize the enduring value of the Mormon
faith in his life—even during his tenure as a federal judge. Permitting judges to serve
in (albeit somewhat restricted) roles in religious organizations, and then suggesting

108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See Parrish v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Ala. State Bar, 524 F.2d 98, 103, 103–04 (5th Cir.
1975) (en banc) (articulating the test as one where a claim under subsection 455(a) is
“supported by facts which would raise a reasonable inference of a lack of impartiality on the
part of the judge in the context of the issues presented in a particular law suit”).
111. The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” U.S.
CONST. amend. I.
112. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990).
113. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303–04 (1940).
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that the values that underpin those organizations can offer no guidance whatsoever
to the judge during the judicial decision-making process makes little sense. It is
possible to be deeply devoted to one’s religion and deeply devoted to the rule of law;
it is possible to occupy a position within a religious community and not allow that
position to dictate an outcome or decision that improperly favors one party.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS
The final Part of this Comment proposes small but targeted amendments to both
Rule 2.4 of the ABA’s Model Code, as well as Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct.
Because the rules in both codes are themselves succinct and only infrequently subject
to change, I suggest an addition to the existing Comment to Rule 2.4 of the Model
Code, and I suggest the addition of two new commentaries to Canon 3 of the Conduct
of Conduct, specifically for Canons 3(A)(1) and 3(C)(1). I do not suggest changes to
Canon 2 of the Code of Conduct (although I discuss Canon 2(A) in Part II),114 because
the objectives of Canon 3—that a judge should perform the duties of office fairly,
impartially, and diligently115—are more aligned with the objectives of my proposed
changes. Canon 2’s focus on the appearance of impropriety is relevant to the
influence of extralegal values in the judicial decision-making process, but the Canon,
per the Commentary to Canon 2(A), refers primarily to the “judge’s honesty,
integrity, impartiality, temperament, or fitness to serve.” 116 Consequently, Canon 3,
which addresses both adjudicative responsibilities (including faithfulness to the law)
as well as disqualification,117 is a more appropriate site for proposed changes
concerning the role of extralegal values in judicial decision-making. First,
faithfulness to the law requires an understanding of when consultation with
extralegal sources is permissible; second, improper use of extralegal sources can
trigger disqualification.
A. Proposed Amendments to Rule 2.4 of the ABA’s Model Code of Judicial Conduct
Rule 2.4 and the Comment to Rule 2.4 state:
Rule 2.4: External Influences on Judicial Conduct
(A) A judge shall not be swayed by public clamor or fear of criticism.
(B) A judge shall not permit family, social, political, financial, or
other interests or relationships to influence the judge’s judicial
conduct or judgment.
(C) A judge shall not convey or permit others to convey the
impression that any person or organization is in a position to influence
the judge.

114.
115.
2014).
116.
117.

See supra text accompanying note 59.
CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 3 (JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
Id. at Canon 2(A) commentary.
Id. at Canon 3.
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Comment on Rule 2.4
[1] An independent judiciary requires that judges decide cases
according to the law and facts, without regard to whether particular
laws or litigants are popular or unpopular with the public, the media,
government officials, or the judge’s friends or family. Confidence in
the judiciary is eroded if judicial decision making is perceived to be
subject to inappropriate outside influences. 118
As it stands, the Comment to Rule 2.4 does not offer any guidance on the proper
use of extralegal values in judicial decision-making. Since Rule 2.4 is the rule
governing external influences, it should provide guidance on how to distinguish
between permissible and impermissible uses of outside influence. I propose adding
the following language to the Comment to Rule 2.4. For ease of understanding I have
included the existing Comment in regular typeface and italicized the proposed
changes.
Proposed Comment to Rule 2.4
[1] An independent judiciary requires that judges decide cases
according to the law and facts, without regard to whether particular
laws or litigants are popular or unpopular with the public, the media,
government officials, or the judge’s friends or family. Confidence in
the judiciary is eroded if judicial decision making is perceived to be
subject to inappropriate outside influences. In determining whether
judicial decision making is subject to inappropriate outside
influences, it is important to distinguish between appropriate
consultation with permissible outside influences, and inappropriate
use of outside influences as the basis for judicial decision making.
Judges come from diverse educational, professional, and
sociocultural backgrounds; Rule 2.4 recognizes that judges should
not be expected to disavow their backgrounds once they enter the
judiciary.
The proposed language has dual purposes: first, to emphasize the difference
between improperly supplanting the law with extralegal sources and properly
consulting extralegal sources to better understand the law and achieve the ultimate
goal of justice. Roy Moore embodies the former; Judge Lipez, the latter. Second, the
proposed language explicitly acknowledges that judges not only come from diverse
backgrounds, but those diverse backgrounds are likely to consciously and
unconsciously guide their respective decision-making processes. The proposed
Comment to Rule 2.4, particularly the last sentence, is a major departure from the
stern yet elusive tone of the current Comment. But comments are supposed to provide
insight into the rules, and the current Comment offers no gloss on “outside
influences.” Such an explanatory abyss helps no one—not in the least judges or
litigants.

118. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.4, r. 2.4 cmt. (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011).
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B. Proposed Amendments to Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct
for United States Judges
1. Canon 3(A)(1)
Canon 3(A), in relevant part, states:
Canon 3: A Judge Should Perform the Duties of the Office Fairly,
Impartially and Diligently
The duties of judicial office take precedence over all other activities.
In performing the duties prescribed by law, the judge should adhere
to the following standards:
(A) Adjudicative Responsibilities.
(1) A judge should be faithful to, and maintain professional
competence in, the law and should not be swayed by partisan interests,
public clamor, or fear of criticism. 119
Canon 3 concerns the performance of adjudicative duties. To help judges perform
adjudicative duties in a manner that sustains its objectives—fairness, impartiality,
and diligence—Canon 3 must offer a more in-depth articulation of what it means to
be faithful to the law than it does at present. As of now, there is no commentary to
3(A)(1). Therefore, my initial proposal is to add commentary; next, within that new
commentary, I propose an explanation of “faithful to . . . the law”:
COMMENTARY
Canon 3(A)(1). Faithfulness to the law requires that the judge look to
the relevant body of law as the primary source of guidance in judicial
decision-making. Yet faithfulness to the law does not preclude
consultation with permissible extralegal sources, so long as the
permissible extralegal sources do not supplant the relevant source of
law as the basis for judicial decision-making.
Canon 3(A)(1)’s commentary should reflect this distinction between “consulting”
and “supplanting” to reiterate the notion that judges are value-sensitive individuals.
As stated in the introductory portion of this Comment, while there is no need for
radical transparency from judges,120 there is a need for acceptance and normalization
of the fact that judges can and do benefit, particularly at the margins of judicial
philosophy, from drawing upon extralegal values in their decision-making processes.
For those who might counter that this proposed Commentary to Canon 3(A)(1) offers
implicit refuge for the Roy Moores of the federal judiciary, such anxieties are
unlikely to materialize. If anything, the saga of Roy Moore is proof that those who
demonstrate disdain for the rule of the law will not survive long in judicial office.

119. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 3 (JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
2014).
120. See supra text accompanying note 22.
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2. Canon 3(C)(1)
Canon 3(C), in relevant part, states:
(C) Disqualification.
(1) A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in
which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned,
including but not limited to instances in which . . . . 121
As of now, there is no commentary associated with Canon 3(C)(1). Because
improper use of extralegal values, including religious values, implicates a judge’s
appearance of impartiality, Canon 3(C)(1) would benefit from an explanation of the
precise standard used to determine whether a judge’s impartiality has been
compromised. Importing the “disinterested person” standard122 for disqualification
under § 455(a), as applied in Idaho v. Freeman, would provide judges, litigants, and
the public with a crucial reminder that impartiality in a judge is never determined
relative to the litigant, but relative to a well-informed, disinterested observer. The
proposed Commentary is as follows:
COMMENTARY
Canon 3(C)(1). A judge should disqualify herself or himself only
when a disinterested observer, knowing all the facts, would determine
that a judge’s appearance of partiality could reasonably be questioned.
A party appearing before a judge can find any number of reasons that he or she
might feel compromises the judge’s impartiality: race or ethnicity, educational and
professional background, geographic ties, and the list goes on. Yet Freeman’s
standard recognizes that parties appearing before a judge are always operating from
an inherently “interested” position. To allow parties’ interests to dictate the standard
for self-disqualification would go against the very principles of natural justice; no
man should be a judge in his own cause.123 The famous words of Sir Edward Coke
in Dr. Bonham’s Case reverberate in Freeman, in § 455(a), and must do so in Canon
3(C)(1) as well.
CONCLUSION
Perhaps it is no coincidence that this Comment ends with a brief discussion of
disqualification. After all, the goal of this Comment is not to argue in favor of relaxed
disqualification standards, but rather to make sense of what judicial impartiality

121. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 3 (JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
2014).
122. Idaho v. Freeman, 507 F. Supp. 706, 733 (D. Idaho 1981).
123. In Dr. Bonham’s Case, when considering the claim of the College of Physicians to
fine its members for malpractice, the Chief Justice, Sir Edward Coke, declared that the censors
of the College “cannot be judges, ministers, and parties . . . quia aliquis non debet esse Judex
in propria causa . . . and one cannot be a judge and attorney for any of the parties.” 8 Co. Rep.
114, 118a (C.P. 1610).
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actually looks like in practice. To engage in a productive conversation about judicial
impartiality, there must be room for discussion of the fundamental extralegal values
that can underpin thoughtful judicial decision-making. Among these values that
strongly shape a judge’s decision-making process, invariably, lies religion. Instead
of shunning conversations surrounding the role of religion in judicial decisionmaking, or clumsily conflating the presence of religious values in judicial decisionmaking with a lack of capacity or desire to separate church and state, scholarship
concerning judicial decision-making must theorize in support of the value-sensitive
judge.

